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Abstract– The paper provides a first attempt to formalize Systems 
of Systems based on game theory and Multi-Agent Systems. We 
propose to use control agents to enforce joint strategies, which 
solve problems arising from the unconstrained interaction of 
autonomous agents and where Nash equilibria are suboptimal. In 
essence, in the resulting systems new solutions emerge, forming 
Systems of Systems that can form hierarchies. In addition, we 
present a learning algorithm that allows the resulting Systems of 
Systems to adapt to varying conditions and uncertainty –in the 
strategies the constituents follow and/or in their payoffs. The 
paper presents mechanisms to formalize Systems of Systems and 
their two main characteristics, namely, emergency and 
adaptability. 
Keywords-multi-agent systems; system of systems; autonomous 
agents; adaptive systems; emergence 
I. SYSTEMS OF SYSTEMS 
Systems of Systems (SoS) are understood as systems that 
describe the integration of large numbers of independent 
systems to optimize global functions and multi-system goals. 
SoS are characterized by their geographic distribution, their 
operational and managerial autonomy, and by the fact that 
they adapt over time as the constituent systems are changed, 
added or removed [1][2]. Notwithstanding their ubiquity and 
strategic importance, there is little agreement on how to 
conceptualize and develop SoS. At this point, we are still 
lacking theories and methods to specify, design, implement 
and validate SoS. This paper constitutes an attempt to solve 
this situation by cataloguing SoS according their two main 
characteristics, namely, autonomy and emergence, and 
providing a formal model for SoS and an algorithm for 
adaptive SoS.  
We first distinguish between single entities, the primitives, 
and entities that consist of a number of entities. Primitives are 
classified according to their autonomy. An autonomous 
primitive, an agent, has its own utility function that tries to 
maximize independently. Objects, on the other hand, are non-
autonomous primitives. A number of primitives can form an 
un-structured collection, or a system, where the primitives 
show structured behavior. Unlike collections, systems cannot 
be reduced to the mere aggregation of their constituent 
primitives and new properties emerge. Formally, collections 
are modeled as sets, and systems as groups [3]. We thus have 
Collections of Objects (CoO, or Collections of Systems, CoS, 
following [4][5] broader ontology) and Collections of Agents 
(CoA, aka Multi-Agent Systems (MAS), a well-established 
area of research whose nomenclature we are using henceforth 
to avoid misunderstandings). On the other hand, there will 
exist Systems of Objects (SoO) and Systems of Agents, which 
we describe as SoS (again, to avoid confusion with existing 
practice). MAS (that is CoA) result from the unconstrained 
interaction amongst autonomous agents, where as SoS are 
systems of autonomous agents whose co-ordination can be 
intervened to allow for the emergence of new solutions that 
satisfy the agents themselves as well as the system as a whole. 
On the other hand, CoO are gatherings of objects without any 
particular order or function; such order and function appear in 
CoS, when a centralized controller organizes them with a 
particular goal in mind. 
As an example: a screw is an object, where as a human 
being is an agent. A CoO can be a collection of the different 
objects that would make up an engine. Without a structure, 
however, they are just a bunch of objects. Under the control of 
an engineer they are assembled to form a SoO. The 
constituents are not autonomous, yet, as a system, they are 
now organized, and show emergent properties: the engine 
converts energy. If we take agents, a MAS is a collection of 
agents, each trying to maximize their own utility, like, say, a 
collection of drivers in a Mad Max movie. A system of agents, 
a SoS, reflects a structure where autonomous agents get co-
ordinated in an effective way, for example by following the 
advice as given in warning notices in the motorway. The 
constituents or primitives are still autonomous but, without an 
explicit centralized control, they form a traffic network in 
which they interact in new ways that guarantee they achieve 
their objectives more efficiently (they will get at their 
destinations safely and quickly); and, as a result, the SoS as 
whole also satisfies higher-order goals (avoid congestions, 
reduction of accidents, drop in pollution). 
In this paper we explore which type of MAS is needed to 
represent SoS, paying particular attention to emergence and 
adaptability. In so doing, we provide the SoS community with 
a valuable framework for the development of SoS and, at the 
same time, propose solutions that can be applied to the 
effective control of MAS. The rest of the paper is structured as 
follows: we next describe briefly the main characteristics of 
software agents and of MAS in terms of game theory; and then 
introduce the idea of C-agents, which enrich the type of 
behavior needed to formalize SoS. In the second part of the 
paper we present a learning algorithm that, if used by C-
agents, will guarantee the adaption of a SoS controller under 
changing conditions, that is, its convergence to optimality as 
the SoS evolves. 
 II. AGENTS AND EMERGENCE IN SYSTEMS OF SYSTEMS 
An agent is assumed to exist in an environment described 
by a set of possible states S, in which it executes actions from 
a given set A. Each time t, the agent “perceives” the state of 
the environment, s ∈S, and performs an action a ∈A. As a 
result, the environment enters into a new state according to a 
transition function, f(s, a) = s’. At the same time, the agent 
receives an immediate real-valued reward following a reward 
function, r(s, a) = r ∈ℜ. The corresponding system can be 
formalized as Markov Decision Process MDP = {S, A, f, r}. 
Notice that the definition of “agent” is kept intentionally 
broad: an agent can be anything that gets input from the 
environment in which it is situated through sensors, and acts 
through actuators. Hence, an agent can be a human being, a 
physical systems or a software system. We don’t need to make 
assumptions about the internal state of the agent. In particular, 
the transition function and the reward function, which together 
constitute the model of the world, may or may not be known 
by the agent. Likewise, the environment can be deterministic 
or stochastic, episodic or sequential. Typically, MDPs apply to 
fully observable environments, in which the agent receives all 
relevant information through its sensors, but our formalism 
can be extended to partially observable MDPs. The goal of the 
agent is to choose a sequence of actions, that is, a policy : S 
 A, which maximizes the cumulative reward (the optimal 
policy). This approach follows Rational Choice Theory (RCT) 
in that agents make decisions that maximize a utility function 
that represents their preferences.  
A. Multi-Agent Systems and Games 
A Multi-Agent System (MAS) is defined as a collection of 
autonomous agents, where each agent will be individually 
motivated to achieve its own goal and to maximize its own 
utility. As a result, no assumptions can be made about agents 
working together cooperatively. This contrast sharply with 
CoS (Distributed Problem Solvers in Artificial Intelligence 
parlance) where control is centralized and individual problem 
solvers contribute towards the achievement of a common goal 
(the maximization of global utility)[6][7]. The way 
autonomous agents interact in MAS can be understood as a 
game. In a game, agents are players, which execute moves. At 
the end of the game each agent receives a payoff or return. A 
set of choices or moves, one per agent, is called a joint 
strategy. There are as many joint strategies as combinations of 
individual choices. For instance, in Fig. 1 Agent1 has two 
choices, A and B, where as Agent2 has three, L, C, and R. 
Hence, there are six joint strategies, namely: 
{A,L},{A,C},{A,R},{B,L},{B,C}, and {B,R}. Each joint 
strategy gives each agent an outcome, as represented in the 
cells of the payoff matrix.  
 
 
Figure 1.  A two-player game, with six joint strategies, represented as a 
payoff matrix in normal form. Cells represent the payoff for each agent using 
the corresponding joint strategy. 
The strategies the agents follow are modulated by their 
attitude towards risk, that is, whether they are risk-averse or 
they tolerate risk. The strategies also vary according to the 
nature of the interaction (one-shot or continuous, simultaneous 
or sequential) and to the type of game they are playing, for 
instance, if the agents engage in a zero-sum game (where what 
one gains the other loses) or in a cooperative game (where 
there may exist win-win solutions). In any case, joint 
strategies are demanded to be in Nash-equilibrium: No agent 
should have an incentive to individually deviate from agreed-
upon strategies. Once a strategy is adopted, under the 
assumption that one agent uses it, the other agent(s) cannot do 
better by using a different strategy.  
Nash equilibrium is a fundamental concept in game theory 
since, for RCT agents, that is, for agents that, at each time 
point, try to maximize their utility function, it gives a 
dominance criterion. It is well-know, however, that such 
solution presents serious drawbacks: Firstly, Nash equilibria 
can be socially irrational as the Prisoners’ Dilemma illustrates 
(Fig. 2). In this game, two criminals, P1 and P2, are arrested 
and are given two options: each can either confess (C) or not 
confess (NC). If both confess, they get 2 years in prison each. 
If neither confesses, they stay only 1 year in prison. However, 
if one confess and the other doesn’t, the defector is rewarded 
for his co-operation and set free, where as the one who doesn’t 
confess gets 3 years in prison. In this game, the Nash 
equilibrium is {confess, confess}: P1 would reason that if he 
confesses then P2 will have an incentive to not confess, and the 
same applies to the second prisoner. So neither will choose 
NC. Notice that even if the prisoners are allowed to 
communicate and reach an agreement, they cannot trust that 
the other part is going to keep their word. Thus, the criminals 
will choose the Nash equilibrium, which is clearly an irrational 
strategy. Both agents will gain if they don’t confess. In 
addition, there are situations in which there is no Nash 
equilibrium (Matching Pennies), or where there are more than 
one Nash equilibrium (Battle of the Sexes).  
 
π
  
Figure 2.  In the Prisoners’ Dilemma, the agents settle for a sub-optimal Nash 
equilibrium, {C,C}, ignoring the Pareto optimal solution {NC,NC}. 
B. C-agents and Systems of Systems 
The problem we are facing in the Prisoners’ Dilemma is 
not that the concept of Nash equilibrium is “wrong”, but rather 
that autonomous agents are free-riders who try to maximize 
their own utility and cannot trust one another. As a 
consequence, agents under-achieve, and settle for sub-optimal 
outcomes, or reach a stalemate where no decisions are made 
(in Matching Pennies and the Battle of Sexes). Hence, relying 
on individual autonomous agents to get co-ordinated on their 
own, or, in other words, assuming that, in a MAS, the 
aggregation of agents will result in harmonious collective 
behavior is a chimera. We argue that the SoS notion gives us 
the right balance between blind cooperation in CoS and 
unrestricted autonomy in MAS, and, following [8], we 
propose to shift from the traditional homo economicus 
approach to multi-agent co-ordination to a homo sociologicus 
approach. In order to do this, we introduce the notion of C-
agent.  
A C-agent is a special type of agent whose transition 
function f operates on states defined as joint strategies (rather 
than individual strategies), and whose actions are normative 
actions. Such actions create a deontic structure (in terms of 
permissions and obligations) and enforce joint strategies –such 
as {NC,NC} in the Prisoners’ Dilemma. C-agent’s actions 
change a sub-optimal joint strategy into an optimal one. C-
agent’s reward function, can take many forms and metrics, 
from the addition of individual utilities (for instance, all 
vehicles get to their destination quickly and safely) to the 
maximization of global utilities (traffic volume, congestion, 
pollution, casualties). The important thing is that the system’s 
properties emerge from the provision of new solutions, 
through a C-agent, to individuals’ problems, not all the way 
around. This is the essence of a SoS. 
 To clarify this concept, let’s recapitulate on the three types 
of systems we are considering using economic systems as an 
example: 
• Planned Economy: a central controller dictates an 
optimal joint plan to maximize global utility. This 
would be a CoS, a collection of systems where the 
parts or systems it consists of are organized according 
to a common goal. Co-ordination takes the form of 
commands from higher nodes, the controllers, to lower 
nodes, forming strict hierarchies. Although problems 
as the ones described above are avoided “by decree”, 
agents are not seen as autonomous entities. 
• Free Market: a collection of autonomous agents work 
under the assumption that an “invisible hand” self-
regulates the behavior of the system. This will 
correspond to MAS in their purest form, where free-
riders try to maximize their own utility. The resulting 
structures go from anarchy to heterarchies of various 
topologies.  
• Interventionism: a C-agent intervenes so that new 
solutions “emerge”. Notice that there is no central 
controller setting the game, the players, their actions 
or their outcomes. And there is no global utility 
function as such that is being maximized. The 
controller only intervenes to “solve problems” and to 
guarantee that the individuals maximize their utility 
functions. We argue that this corresponds to SoS. 
Importantly, hierarchies are formed as in Fig. 3. 
 
 
Figure 3.  A hierarchy of systems. C-agents (Ci) intervene in the co-
ordination of systems (si), forming SoSi. In turn, such SoSi are systems of 
higher-order SoS. 
This behavior can be seen in all types of SoS. If smart 
grids or the Internet were to function in a deregulated way, the 
greed of the components will prevent them from reaching 
mutually beneficial solutions, solutions that also benefit the 
system as a whole, avoiding faults, blockages, etc. For 
instance, in traffic networks drivers have their own goals and 
make their own choices (when to drive and where to go, which 
route to take, etc.). However, for them to reach their objectives 
(reach the destination in the shortest time and safely) they 
cannot act in an unconstrained way. They must abide by some 
rules, the traffic code. In so doing, they maximize their utility 
functions and that of the SoS: the network works smoothly, 
traffic flows without jams. It is precisely this “order within 
chaos” where new behaviors (solutions to the traffic game) 
emerge.  
Apart from their “constrained” autonomy and emergence, 
SoS are characterized by their adaptability. Complex systems 
are highly dynamic and inherently uncertain. Hence, they need 
to learn from and adapt to changing conditions. 
 III. ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS OF SYSTEMS 
Reinforcement Learning (RL) is the most influential 
learning paradigm in implementing adaptive agents. 
According to RL, an agent interacts with the environment and, 
by trial and error, learns an optimal policy. Formally, the idea 
is to learn a separate value for each action leading out of a 
state V(s, a), defined as the sum of the immediate reward the 
agent receives and predictions that decay with time according 
to a factor γ (illustrating that predictions on future values are 
uncertain and thus carry less weight). With this information, 
the agent calculates the “error” between successive 
predictions, using a delta rule like Q-learning’s [9],  
 ΔV(s, a) = r + γ max
a'
 V(s', a') - V(s, a)        (1) 
The output is used to update the V value according to  
 NewV(s, a) = OldV(s, a) + αΔV(s, a)   (2) 
where α is a learning rate. When accompanied with a trace, 
λ, representing the eligibility of a given (s, a) pair, these two 
equations define the so-called Temporal Difference algorithm 
(TD). TD complies with Bellman’s Principle of Optimality 
[10]: If the target value is met for all states in the state space S, 
then the policy is globally optimal. 
A. Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning 
There exist a plethora of proposals in the literature on how 
to extend RL to MAS, all of which follow in one way or 
another the Free Market model described in Section II (see 
[11] for a survey). The simplest way to extend the single-agent 
Q-learning algorithm to multi-agent games is to add a 
subscript to the original formulae, that is, to have the learning 
agent pretend that the environment is passive. However simple 
this technique may be, the definition of the V-values assumes 
incorrectly that they are independent of the actions selected by 
other agents. Second, it is no longer sensible to use the 
maximum of the V-values to update individual policies. In 
order to solve this problem, a minimax Q-learning algorithm 
can be used. However, minimax only applies to strictly 
competitive games. Alternatively, an agent can update its V-
values based on its expectations on the likelihood of the other 
agent’s policies. This approach, called Joint Action Learners, 
is useful in the context of common-payoff games (aka team 
games or pure co-ordination games) in which agents that 
receive the same pay-off at each outcome co-operate, but, like 
minimax, it does not apply to general-sum games. As a general 
solution, it has been proposed that agents update the V-values 
based on some Nash equilibrium, using Nash-Q learning or 
one of its many variants. Notwithstanding its merits, the 
conditions for convergence in Nash Q-learning are very 
restrictive, and it only converges in special cases. In addition, 
as in Section II, the solution, a Nash-equilibrium, has no 
prescriptive force. 
This inability to solve the RL problem in MAS has led to 
the abandonment of the equilibrium agenda in favor of optimal 
agent designs that comply with social criteria. Our proposal, to 
apply RL to C-agents as a mechanism to make MAS, rather 
SoS, adaptive, can be framed within this new approach. 
B. C-agent Learning  
To develop adaptive SoS we don’t need to consider the 
integration of a collection of independent learners à la Multi-
Agent RL. Rather, it is enough to consider how the C-agent of 
the SoS learns. In order to do so, we can use single-agent TD. 
In the case of C-agents, the states and the actions in the V-
values, V(s.a), are associated to joint strategies and normative 
actions. However intuitive this approach is, there are two 
problems which prevent us from applying directly the Q-
learning algorithm to C-agents and SoS, namely:  
1. Q-learning, as any TD algorithm, is model-free. That 
is, the agents do not know the transition function or 
the reward function. In SoS on the other hand, the C-
agent does have a model of the joint strategies and of 
the resulting payoffs. That is, learning in SoS is 
model-based. 
2. Since Q-learning agents are model-free, they must 
explore the whole state space to abide by Bellman’s 
Principle of Optimality. As a result, Q-learning 
converges to optimality only in tabular cases [12]. 
Contrarily, C-agents do not require exploration. This 
is convenient since SoS work with large state spaces.  
Recently, we have presented a model-based variation of 
TD, which we call Value Gradient Learning (VGL) [13]. VGL 
works in continuous state spaces, and it does so without 
exploration. It seems thus an ideal candidate for adaptive C-
agents. The main difference between TD and VGL lies on 
what is learned: VGL learns gradients of values as opposed to 
TD algorithms that only learn values. We define the value 
gradient as 
   G(s, a) = 
∂V(s, a)
∂s
 (3) 
and the approximate value gradient as  
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
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The VGL algorithm is defined at each t by a weight update 
of the form  
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where G’ is the target value gradient defined recursively 
by 
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 We have proved that any greedy trajectory for which the 
target gradient is met, is locally extremal, and often locally 
optimal. With VGL, the trajectories follow a greedy gradient, 
that is, they bend towards optimality at each point. This local 
optimality condition needs satisfying only over a single 
trajectory, whereas for TD the corresponding optimal 
condition (Bellman’s) needs satisfying over the whole state 
space. Crucially, a trajectory can reach a fixed point using TD 
and still be far away from optimality. It should be noticed that 
VGL is not a differentiated form of TD, that is, VGL does not 
abide by Bellman’s equation in continuous spaces (HJB 
equation). In fact, VGL is equivalent to Pontryagin’s 
Mimimum Principle (PMP) commonly used in control systems 
theory [14].  
IV. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we present a new approach to SoS based on a 
classification of different types of systems and the way the 
interaction and get co-ordinated. In particular, we identify C-
agents as a notion that allows us to move from MAS to SoS. 
The agents playing such role can intervene and enforce new 
solutions to a MAS problem, and are thus instrumental in 
providing space for emergent properties. We believe that this 
analysis is a starting point for the development of a 
methodology that may lead to the systematic design of SoS. 
Examining the rules of composition of the subsystems and 
their coordination as agents in a larger system defines a 
challenging new area for research and requires links across 
many disciplines. Multi-Agent theory and adaptive games may 
provide an avenue for describing the new notion of the system 
play that now provides the substitute to the interconnection 
topology of the standard systems theory.  The potential for 
applications is well beyond the traditional engineering field. 
In this new framework for SoS, subsystems appear as 
autonomous systems which follow their own interests and thus 
act as agents participating in games. This introduces the idea 
that the system can be seen from a controller perspective 
where actions are defined as the outcomes of adaptive games. 
We would like to stress that such view is hierarchical and that 
it gives as a formal tool to construct increasingly complex 
SoS. We have also introduced VGL as a model-based 
algorithm that allows the controller to learn on-line how to 
adapt the SoS so as to convergence to optimality. Providing a 
representation of the system play in more general cases 
requires some further work and the introduction of a formal set 
up. This is an area under investigation. 
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